Teesta Water Sharing Treaty

Bangladesh is often called the "land of rivers," and for good reason. The country is crisscrossed by more than 700 rivers, forming one of the most complex river networks anywhere in the world. Of these, 54 rivers are transboundary — shared between Bangladesh and India. That is a staggering number of shared waterways for two neighboring countries, and it makes water diplomacy not just important, but absolutely essential.

Among all these rivers, the Teesta holds a special place. The Teesta River is approximately 315 km long, originating from the Pauhunri glacier in Sikkim, India. It flows southward through the narrow Siliguri Corridor in West Bengal, then crosses into Bangladesh, where it covers about 114 km before joining the Brahmaputra (Jamuna) River. In Bangladesh, the Teesta is the lifeline of the entire Rangpur division — think of it as the main water supply for a region where millions of people farm rice, jute, wheat, and vegetables.

Here is the problem: during the monsoon season (June to September), the Teesta floods aggressively, causing damage on both sides of the border. But during the dry season (October to April), the river's flow drops dramatically — sometimes to less than 1,000 cubic feet per second in Bangladesh, down from over 200,000 cubic feet per second during peak monsoon. That is a drop of more than 99%. For farmers in Rangpur and Dinajpur, this means their fields go from waterlogged to bone-dry in a matter of weeks.

The Teesta Water Sharing Treaty was supposed to fix this. It was designed to create a fair, rules-based system for sharing the river's water between Bangladesh and India. A draft agreement was actually ready back in 2011, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was scheduled to sign it during a visit to Dhaka. But the signing never happened. As of today, the treaty remains unsigned — one of the most frustrating unresolved issues in South Asian diplomacy.

Early Negotiations and the Joint Rivers Commission

Talks about sharing Teesta water are not new — they go back nearly five decades. Shortly after Bangladesh gained independence in 1971, both countries realized that managing shared rivers required formal mechanisms. In 1972, the Bangladesh-India Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was established. Its job was straightforward: study the shared rivers, collect data, and recommend solutions for water sharing and flood management.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, the JRC held multiple rounds of discussions. But progress was painfully slow. Both governments had other priorities — domestic politics, economic challenges, border disputes — and the Teesta issue kept getting pushed to the back burner. It is a pattern you see often in international diplomacy: urgent problems get attention, while important problems wait in line.

The Ganges Treaty Precedent (1996)

A major breakthrough came in 1996 with the Ganges Water Treaty. This was a landmark 30-year agreement between Bangladesh and India to share the water of the Ganges River at the Farakka Barrage. The deal set a clear formula: during the lean season, both countries would share the water based on a pre-agreed schedule, with guarantees for minimum flows.

The Ganges Treaty proved that Bangladesh and India could reach a water-sharing agreement when there was political will. It also raised expectations. If the two countries could settle the Ganges dispute, surely the Teesta — a smaller river — should be easier to resolve, right? That was the thinking at the time. Unfortunately, the Teesta turned out to be a far more complicated political problem than anyone expected.

The 2007-2011 Push for a Deal

In 2007, during a joint meeting, Bangladesh formally proposed that it should receive 80% of the Teesta's dry-season flow. India rejected this outright, countering with a proposal that would give India 55% and Bangladesh just 25%, leaving 20% unallocated for environmental flows. The gap between the two positions was enormous.

Then came a diplomatic turning point. In 2010, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited India. During her meetings with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the Teesta issue was front and center. Singh personally assured Hasina that the matter would be resolved quickly. By 2011, a draft treaty was ready. The proposed split was more moderate: India would receive 42.5% and Bangladesh would receive 37.5%, with the remaining 20% left as unallocated buffer flow. Singh was scheduled to sign it during his visit to Dhaka in September 2011.

To put that in perspective, imagine two business partners negotiating over revenue splits. They have been arguing for years, and they finally agree on a formula. The contract is printed, the pens are on the table — and then one partner's regional manager refuses to sign off. That is essentially what happened with the Teesta deal.

The proposed treaty was never just about splitting water percentages. It had several interconnected goals:

• Equitable Distribution: Establish a fair formula for sharing Teesta water during both the monsoon and dry seasons. The word "equitable" is key here — it does not necessarily mean "equal." It means fair, given each country's needs and the river's capacity.

• Cooperative Management: Create a joint management framework where both countries share real-time data on water flow, rainfall, and dam releases. Without this, Bangladesh has little visibility into what India does with upstream water.

• Dispute Resolution: Provide a formal mechanism for resolving disagreements. Currently, when Bangladesh feels it is not getting enough water, there is no binding arbitration process — just diplomatic complaints.

• Regional Cooperation: Strengthen the broader Bangladesh-India relationship. Water disputes create bitterness at every level — from farmers at the border to diplomats in Dhaka and Delhi. A treaty would ease tensions significantly.

• Environmental Protection: Address the ecological impact of upstream dams and diversions on the Teesta basin ecosystem. Rivers need minimum flows to sustain fish populations, wetlands, and biodiversity. Over-extraction hurts everyone in the long run.

Think of these goals as the terms of a financial contract. You are not just agreeing on a number — you are agreeing on reporting standards, dispute resolution mechanisms, and long-term sustainability. Without all of these elements, any deal would be incomplete.

Bangladesh's Teesta Barrage

Bangladesh began constructing the Teesta Barrage in 1979, and the project was completed by 1990. Located at Dalia in Lalmonirhat district, the barrage was designed to serve one primary purpose: irrigation. The Teesta Barrage Irrigation Project was built to bring water to approximately 750,000 hectares (about 1.85 million acres) of farmland across the Rangpur, Dinajpur, and Bogura regions of northern Bangladesh.

To understand the scale, 750,000 hectares is roughly the size of the entire country of Luxembourg. That is how much agricultural land depends on Teesta water in Bangladesh. When the river flows normally, this system works well — canals distribute water across the region, and farmers can grow two or even three crop cycles per year. When the river dries up, the entire system collapses.

India's Gazaldoba Barrage

India built the Gazaldoba Barrage in 1986 on the upper Teesta in the Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal, upstream from the Bangladesh border. The barrage serves a dual purpose: it diverts water for irrigation in West Bengal and supports hydropower generation through a network of dams in Sikkim.

The numbers tell a clear story. India irrigates approximately 920,000 hectares using Teesta water, compared to Bangladesh's 750,000 hectares. On top of that, India operates 25 to 30 hydropower projects on the Teesta River in Sikkim, generating electricity for the region. This means India uses the Teesta for both agriculture and energy — giving it a stronger economic incentive to control upstream water flow.

Here is a simple way to think about it: imagine a pipeline that supplies water to two factories. Factory A (India) is located upstream and has installed pumps to divert most of the water for its operations. Factory B (Bangladesh) is downstream and gets whatever is left over. Factory A is irrigating more land and running power plants off the same water supply. Without a formal agreement governing how much each factory can take, the upstream factory has all the leverage.

Agriculture in Northern Bangladesh

Bangladesh's economy is heavily agricultural, and the northern districts along the Teesta are some of the most productive farming areas in the country. The Teesta Barrage irrigation system covers 750,000 hectares across the Rangpur, Dinajpur, and Bogura divisions. These regions produce rice, wheat, jute, potatoes, and a range of vegetables that feed millions of people.

For the average farmer in Rangpur, the Teesta is not a policy issue — it is a survival issue. When the river carries enough water, families can grow crops, sell their harvest, and earn a livelihood. When the water dries up, they face what Bangladeshis call "monga" — a seasonal famine that hits northern Bangladesh during lean months. "Monga is the price we pay for someone else's dam," as one Rangpur farmer described it to the BBC. The connection between upstream water control and downstream poverty is direct and brutal.

India's Hydropower Ambitions

On the Indian side, the Teesta is viewed differently. For the state of Sikkim, the river is a gold mine of hydroelectric potential. The steep gradient of the Teesta as it descends from the Himalayas makes it ideal for hydropower. India has built or planned 25 to 30 hydropower projects on the Teesta in Sikkim alone, with a combined capacity running into thousands of megawatts.

This is where the economics get complicated. Hydropower projects require controlled water flow — you cannot generate electricity if the river is allowed to run freely downstream. Each dam and diversion point reduces the volume and timing of water available to Bangladesh. It is a classic example of what economists call a "negative externality" — India captures the economic benefit (electricity), while Bangladesh bears the cost (water shortage).

The Dry Season Problem

The core of the dispute is seasonal. During the monsoon, there is more than enough water for everyone — in fact, the problem is often too much water causing floods. But during the dry season, from roughly October to April, the Teesta's flow decreases dramatically. With India diverting water at Gazaldoba and through its hydropower network, the amount reaching Bangladesh drops to what many describe as a trickle.

Satellite imagery and on-the-ground reporting have shown that during peak dry season, large stretches of the Teesta riverbed in Bangladesh are completely dry. Farmers who depend on the Teesta Barrage canals find them empty. Fishing communities along the river lose their income. The downstream ecological system — wetlands, fisheries, groundwater recharge — deteriorates year after year.

"The Teesta is not just a river for us. It is our economy, our food, our future. When India takes the water, they take everything," said a local leader from Lalmonirhat in an interview with Al Jazeera. This sentiment captures the desperation felt by millions across northern Bangladesh.

"The Teesta treaty hanging for 11 years is embarrassing." That was the blunt assessment delivered on May 30, 2022, in Guwahati, summing up years of frustration on both sides. But how did a deal that was ready to sign in 2011 end up in diplomatic limbo for over a decade? The answer lies in the complicated relationship between India's central government and its state governments.

The 2011 Collapse

In September 2011, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was set to visit Dhaka and sign the Teesta agreement. The draft was finalized — India would receive 42.5% of the dry-season flow, Bangladesh would receive 37.5%, and 20% would remain unallocated. Both the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Bangladesh government had approved the text. Pens were ready.

Then, just days before the signing, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee announced she would not attend the ceremony and publicly opposed the deal. Her argument was that sharing Teesta water with Bangladesh would hurt farmers in North Bengal, particularly in the districts of Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, and parts of Siliguri that depend on the Gazaldoba Barrage for irrigation.

Manmohan Singh, who led a coalition government at the time, could not afford to alienate Banerjee politically. He dropped the Teesta treaty from the agenda. The signing was canceled. For Bangladesh, it was a devastating diplomatic blow — a deal years in the making, killed at the last minute by state-level politics in India.

State vs. Central Government Politics

To understand why this happened, you need to understand India's federal structure. Water is a "state subject" under India's constitution, which means state governments have significant authority over rivers flowing through their territory. The central government in New Delhi can negotiate international treaties, but implementing those treaties often requires state cooperation.

Mamata Banerjee, who founded the Trinamool Congress party and has been Chief Minister of West Bengal since 2011, has consistently opposed the Teesta deal. Her political base includes North Bengal, where farmers rely on Teesta water. For her, agreeing to share that water with Bangladesh is a potential vote-loser. As one Indian political analyst put it: "Mamata will not sign away North Bengal's water for a diplomatic achievement that benefits New Delhi, not Kolkata."

This dynamic — where a state leader can effectively veto a national foreign policy decision — is relatively unusual globally. In most countries, the central government has the authority to sign international treaties without needing approval from regional leaders. But in India's coalition-style politics, state leaders wield enormous power, especially when the ruling party at the center needs their support.

Even after the BJP came to power at the center under Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014, the situation did not change. Modi's government recognized that pushing the Teesta deal without West Bengal's consent would create a political firestorm. Multiple rounds of talks, high-level visits, and diplomatic back-channels have failed to break the deadlock. The treaty remains in limbo — a victim of India's internal politics as much as any bilateral disagreement.

Here is an analogy that might help. Imagine a multinational corporation negotiating a joint venture with a foreign company. The CEO (India's central government) agrees to the terms, but the regional VP (West Bengal) who controls the key factory refuses to participate. Without the factory, the deal is meaningless. That is the Teesta treaty in a nutshell.

The failure to sign the Teesta Water Sharing Treaty is not just a diplomatic inconvenience — it has real consequences for real people. Millions of farmers in northern Bangladesh face water shortages every dry season. Their crop yields decline, their incomes drop, and seasonal poverty deepens. On the Indian side, the lack of a formal agreement means there are no binding rules governing how much water can be diverted — creating uncertainty for everyone.

The broader impact on Bangladesh-India relations cannot be overstated. Water is an emotional issue in Bangladesh. Every failed round of negotiations, every dry riverbed photograph shared on social media, fuels public frustration. For India, the inability to resolve the Teesta issue undermines its claims of being a responsible regional power and a good neighbor.

There are reasons for cautious optimism. Both countries have a track record of eventually finding solutions — the 1996 Ganges Treaty proves that. International attention to transboundary water disputes is growing, and climate change is making water management more urgent than ever. The Teesta's glacial source in Sikkim is shrinking, which means the total available water will decrease over time, making a sharing agreement even more critical.

"The Teesta treaty is not just about water. It is about trust between two nations that share a border, a history, and a future," as a senior Bangladeshi diplomat once observed. Until that trust translates into a signed document, the Teesta will remain one of South Asia's most consequential unresolved disputes — and millions of farmers will continue to watch the river dry up, waiting for a deal that has been "almost ready" for more than a decade.